The amounts recovered in compensation by the victims of medical negligence (and other personal injuries) often give rise to strong feelings of injustice from both the injured and the paying party. 'The purpose of the award for an injured plaintiff is, in so far as a sum of money can do so, to put hiin as nearly as possible in the same position as he was in before he was injured." The difficulty is that whilst the cost of nursing care and the claimant's loss of earnings can be calculated in nioney terms, his pain, suffering and loss of amenity cannot. Only a gesture is usually made in respect of these items, even though their impact niay be far greater than any financial loss. Where a psychiatric injury is involved the task beconies still more difficult.
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Injured claimants frequently feel that the sums awarded for pain and suffering and the statutory sum of /3'500 for bereavement are paltry and derisory and do not reflect the real impact on their lives. At the same time defendant doctors and Health Authorities, while acknowledging lapses in standards of care, feel the overall sunis awarded to injured claimants are excessive for the level of fault involved. The sunis awarded are also seen as an unreasonable burden on health service budgets, which might ultimately lead to closure of wards and reduced services. To complicate matters further, the niedia attention given to the few very large awards for severely handicapped children which gives the general public a false idea of the general level of damages paid for lesser injuries.
To introduce the topic and the issues and principles that underlie compensation we provide four examples, both from the point of view of their personal impact and the anioutits of compeiisation they would probably attract. Consider the four scenarios presented in Boxes 1-4.
You have a routine orthopaedic operation to set a fracture. The recovery is unduly prolonged, and eventually a second operation is required to reset the bone. You are not in great pain, but movement is awkward and you are ultimately off work for 1 year.
Box 1 I You have a routine operation in which the anaesthetic is inadequate and you are briefly awake during the operation. You manage to return to work after 1 month but for 3 years suffer intense anxiety, nightmares and depression and are diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Your marriage suffers and family relationships are strained throughout this period.
Box 2
I After a routine abdominal operation, your bowel is perforated and initially it goes unrecognized. You spend several days in intense pain, before a corrective operation is carried out. Thereafter you are in continual pain, which varies in intensity, despite numerous further investigations and treatment. You are able to return to work and fight to maintain your career and your interest in your work. You are physically less fit than before, much less active and have sexual problems. It is not clear whether you will ever be free of pain.
Box 3

I
Following an uneventful pregnancy, your child is stillborn due to failure to recognize fetal distress. The loss is, naturally, catastrophic for both you and your partner. The bereavement is intense and prolonged, but you manage not to succumb to psychiatric disorder and cope with support from friends and family. The bereavement process begins to ease when another baby is born safely 2 years later.
Fortunately we never have to choose between these various fates. Nevertheless most of us could express strong opinions on which we would most want to avoid and, in that seiise, o n which scenario would overall be the most traumatic for our families and us. We could in a sense attach a value, albeit a negative one, to each scenario.
Values arc also attached to these scenarios, in finaii-cia1 terms, when compensation is assessed. The exact amounts are not important to this discussion. However, in broad terms, for a person in full-time work, the scenario in Box 1 will attract the greatest compensation, those in Boxes 2 and 3 considerably less and that in Box 4 probably the most traumatic, the least compensation, The amounts of compensation bear little relation to the suffering involved. They are, in fact, almost in reverse order; the most awful events attract the least compensation and the least difficult, the most compensation. H o w can this be explained to traumatized people and can it be justified?
Underlying this is, of course, is an argument about the principles on which compensation should be based and on the resolution of conflicts between these principles. Should we be guided mainly by previous suffering or by costs of future care? Should physical injury or psychological damage predominate and how should psychiatric disorder be viewed? Should those who suffer intensely but are not accorded a psychiatric diagnosis be compensated less? H o w should loss of earnings be viewed in this scheme? Is being off work for 1 year really such a disaster in comparison with the loss of a child, as the law relating to compensation would seem to indicate? Is the argument that such suffering siniply cannot be either measured or compensated really sensible?
This issue of Clinical Risk explores these issues and considers whether compensation needs to be approached differently. In the first paper, Maurice . . . the law's emphasis on psychiatric diagnosis, as opposed to distress and suflering, is misguided in principle and in practice leads to inappropriate use of psychiatric terminology.
Lipsedge discusses the assessment of pain and suffcring and the impact of trauma on a person's life, giving particular attention to the circumstances in which a psychiatric diagnosis is appropriate. Lipsedge argues that the law's emphasis on psychiatric diagnosis, as opposed to distress and suffering, is misguided in principle and in practice leads to inappropriate use of psychiatric terniiiiology. He suggests that a greater degree of conipensation be extended to people who show an ordinary reaction to trauma, which may involve considerable pain and suffering, yet no psychiatric disorder. In the second paper Elizabeth Anne Gumbel outlines the principles and practice of compensation as currcntly practised, and discusses the conclusions of the recent Law Coinmission report. The report reconimends that Compensation for daniages for pain and suffering be increased, but without challenging the basis on which compensation is awarded. In the final paper, Magi Young offers a critique of current practice and discusses means by which solicitors can effectively assess pain, suffering and impact on quality of life and so argue for compensation which is coninicnsurate with the trauma suffered.
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